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Why focus on Australian shipbuilding and 
repair?
• “The jewel in the defence industry crown”
– naval vessels the only major platforms built in Australia
– shipbuilders the highest profile element of domestic defence industry 
• Legacy of domestic warship building and maintenance capabilities
– island continent with a small population and history of sea-borne 
migration and trade   
– shipbuilding peaked during WWII: over 100 warships built and over 
5,000 naval repairs completed
• Procurement of naval vessels and the disposition of shipbuilding
facilities highly politicised
– competing interests of different states, services and industries
– high profile ‘troubled projects’ (eg, Collins Class submarines)
– focus of defence industry and procurement reforms since 1980s
• Broader implications for defence procurement and industry policies
• Lessons for other small countries
Small country perspective 
• Planned expenditure of Aus$30.5 billion (2006 prices) on naval 
construction and sustainment 2006-2025 (c. US$27.5 billion)
• 63% of that to be spent in-country (less on construction and more 
on sustainment)
2008-2037, US Navy plans to spend on construction alone 
US$25 billion a year (2009 prices), nearly all in-country
• 4 local shipbuilders (2 multinational, 2 Australian)
• Further consolidation expected
• Small number of shipbuilding and maintenance facilities with legacy 
of separation between construction and maintenance
• Mostly foreign OEMs and combat system integrators
• A large number of small local sub-contractors 
• Limited exports, focus on import substitution
Shipbuilding cycles
Three post-war warship building cycles
• 1950s and 1960s (destroyers, patrol boats and support ships)
late 1960s – early 1980s: no naval combatants built in-country
• mid 1980s – late 2000s (frigates, submarines, minehunters and 
support ships)
• late 2000s – late 2010s (AWDs, LHDs, support vessels)
fourth cycle to begin after 2018
First cycle: The troubled years
• Government-owned shipyards
– ‘central planning’ approach to shipyard management 
– sheltered workshop culture
– overcapacity
– industrial disputes
– cost reimbursement contracts 
• Local content preferences
– ill-fated local designs





Lean years: Import-based approach 
• No warships build for twenty years after the first cycle
• Switch to imports (design and construction)
• In-country activity limited to
– non-combatant vessel construction
– some refit work
– mostly repair work
• Poor outcomes
– insufficient capacity to contract and manage imports
• poor FFG deal under FMS
• inability to manage variations in acquisition scope and technological 
change
• non-enforceable (out-of-contract) offsets arrangements
– inadequate local industry base to support fleet in wartime
Second cycle: Local revival
• Shipyard reforms
– corporatisation (ADI) and privatisation (Tenix) of shipyards
– improved industrial relations
• Procurement reforms
– specialisation: Defence Acquisition Organisation (ADO) 
– accountability: Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) (prescribed 
agency)
– risk management through fixed price contracts
– core competencies: project management
• Local content preferences
– high local content targets (construction) but offsets phased out
– imported designs and combat systems
– moderate cost premia for in-country construction (regional preferences)
– self-reliance in fleet sustainment in wartime
Second cycle: Local revival
• Rhetoric of market competition
• Standard procurement model: one size fits all
• Outcomes: mixed bag 
– good (performance-cost-schedule) outcomes for conventional warships 
(frigates, minehunters, patrol boats)
– the troubled Collins Class submarine project (complex system 
integration, contract mgt, risk mgt)
– shipbuilding: new ‘legacy industry’
Third cycle: Sustainment
• Shipbuilders
– growing foreign ownership (Thales/ADI) (BAE Systems/Tenix)
– government-owned common use facilities (complementary resources) 
• Procurement reforms
– Kinnaird Review: capability focus and British-style (two-pass) 
government approval system
– DMO: synergies in capability formation and sustainment
• partnering arrangements with prime contractors
• contractual arrangements with ‘service customers’
– core competencies: complex project management
– tailoring acquisition models to projects
– incentive contracts with focus on synergistic relationship mgt
– new procurement model for mega projects
• alliance-based target incentive model
• the overall coordination vested in DMO
Third cycle: Sustainment
• Local content preferences
– moderate local content targets (construction and system integration)
– proven imported designs and combat systems
– cost premia for in-country construction (regional preferences)
• Less competitive rhetoric
– ‘locally-fronted’ competition for new prime and OEM contracts 
(reasonable for-the-market competition)
– little scope for in-project switching of prime contractors and OEMs
(minimal in-the-market competition)
– but reasonable for- and in-the-market competition upstream in the 
supply chain
• Construction contracts evolving into collaborative sustainment 
arrangements (Collins Class, ANZACs)
First cycle: Procurement model
OEMs Government
Contractors shipyard
Prime Relationship command-style, adversarial
Prime Deal Prime Contract




Second cycle: Standard procurement model
2nd & 3rd tier    OEMs     Shipyard      Combat sys.   Platform    Prime
contractors integrator designer    contractor
Cost 65% 15%            7%            13%
Prime Contract detailed, fixed price, variations
Prime Deal Prime Relationship




Third cycle: Complex procurement model
2nd & 3rd tier    OEMs     Shipyard     Platform      Prime platform  
contractors designer      contractor       




Prime Relationship synergistic prime alliance
Prime Deal Prime Contract
deliverable imported design   prime alliance-based target
price productivity growth incentives incentive agreement
schedule tight
DMO Navy
Lessons for small countries
• Local demand
– monopsonistic local buyer 
– small, lumpy, often capricious and difficult to smooth 
– prone to idiosyncratic (tailored) product specifications and requirements 
creep
– complex pork barreling
• regional interests and legacy industries
• shifts focus to platforms away from knowledge-intensive systems
• Export markets
– hard to penetrate (marketing impediments and high transaction costs)
– local content/offsets demands favour FDI and factor mobility
– depend on government facilitation (product endorsement, international 
workshare arrangements)
Lessons for small countries
• Supply
– barriers to entry: asset specificity and capital intensity
– globalisation: multinational system integrators and OEMs  
– idiosyncratic product specifications provide a degree of protection for 
in-country suppliers
– not enough in-the-market competition to sustain leanness and 
productivity growth (bilateral monopolies) 
• Defence procurement and industry policies to
– induce public investment in common use facilities and quasi-vertical 
integration to enhance for- and in-the-market competition (lower entry 
and exit barriers)
– reduce hold up risks (the art of  ‘smart’ monopsony) 
• tailor procurement models and incentive contracts to projects
• mitigate risks of complex/mega acquisitions through risk-sharing 
arrangements with primes and OEMs
